This study examines the financial reporting and economic consequences of the mandatory introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the time of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Australia. As the process of going public is characterised by high levels of information asymmetry this setting allows us to investigate if IFRS contribute effectively to an improvement in the financial information environment. Our findings imply that IFRS adoption has not improved IPO earnings forecast accuracy. Uncertainty surrounding new standards and operational hurdles due to their increased complexity has been the main constraints. There are signals that time allowance for market adaptation will help on achieving better forecast accuracy. Results interestingly indicate behavioural change, as optimistic earnings forecasts during the GAAP era turn pessimistic in the IFRS period.
Introduction
The regulatory switch from domestic accounting standards (local GAAP) to IFRS has significantly affected financial reporting practices worldwide. By today, almost 120 countries require or permit financial statements to be prepared in accordance with IFRS (Deloitte, 2011; IASB, 2011) . In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed a roadmap to potentially allow U.S. issuers the use of IFRS for fiscal years beginning in 2014 (SEC, 2008) . Issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), IFRS are a set of high quality and globally applicable financial reporting standards that are based on accounting-principles instead of accountingrules (IASB, 2011; Carmona and Trombetta, (2008) . As a result, policy setters and financial regulators expect that IFRS, as a common set of high quality financial reporting standards enhance transparency and comparability of financial statements across different jurisdictions and thereby contribute effectively to an efficient functioning as well as the global integration of capital markets (European
Union (EU) (2002)).
However, the extensive empirical literature to date has failed to consistently assign positive accounting as well as economic effects to the introduction of IFRS, thus raising doubts about their practical application. On the one hand, proponents argue that IFRS are of higher quality than local standards and restrict accounting discretion. In turn, this improves market transparency and as a result ameliorates the financial reporting environment. As a result, firms experience a reduction in their cost of capital and an increase in market liquidity, e.g. by lower bid-ask spreads (e.g. Daske et al., (2008); Li, (2010) ). On the other hand, opponents of IFRS believe that the effects of changes in accounting regulations are negligibly small or may even deteriorate financial reporting quality (e.g. Jeanjean and Stolowy, (2008) ). Instead, these studies often point to other factors that shape the quality of accounting amounts, such as the countries" legal, institutional and cultural background. therefore exploit the unique characteristics of the Australian capital market where firms seeking a listing can voluntarily provide an earnings forecast in their IPO prospectuses. As the process of going public is characterised by a high degree of information asymmetry between company insiders and outside investors, this setting allows us to examine the ability of IFRS to contribute effectively to an improvement in the financial information environment in a previously unexplored field.
We test whether the application of IFRS increases the quality and reliability of accounting information and consequently reduces the amount of heterogeneously-distributed information to benefit the capital market. In fact, we examine the accuracy of profit forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses under different accounting regulations, namely former Australian Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (AGAAP) and IFRS. We expect that the application of IFRS will reduce home bias, improve the efficiency of information intermediaries and finally positively affects the accuracy of IPO profit forecasts. Additionally, we investigate whether managers are able to anticipate the direction of the forecast bias and adjust stock prices accordingly on the first day of trading. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide evidence on the accounting and capital market effects of IFRS in the context of IPOs.
Our study focuses on Australia for several reasons. This institutional setting allows us to distinguish directly between the pre-and post-IFRS adoption period and thus to avoid interferences.
Third IPOs in Australia can voluntarily provide an earnings forecast figure in their prospectus to signal future profitability to investors. In turn, this is expected to reduce the level of information 2 However, as opposed to the directive in the EU, other reporting entities such as private as well as not-for-profit companies were required to comply with IFRS as well, making the consequences of the IFRS application much broader in Australia than for instance in the EU (AASB, 2004) . Furthermore, the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) made some additional amendments in the Australian version of IFRS (A-IFRS) that take into account special characteristics of the Australian legislative and economic environment. For a full comparison between A-IFRS and IFRS see Deloitte (2005) .
asymmetry between company insiders and outside investors and to avoid problems of adverse selection in the IPO market. Fourth, as wrong forecasts may mislead investors, the credibility of this kind of information largely depends on its accuracy. However, previous evidences on IPOs forecast accuracy in Australia has documented high inaccuracy of the profit forecasts included in IPO prospectuses 3
. For example, findings by critically question the credibility of forecast information as a means to reduce the prevailing information asymmetry among the parties involved in the IPO process as investors cannot rely on the information provided by management when considering investments in the Australian IPO market.
Using a sample of 221 profit forecasts of Australian IPOs between 2001 and 2009, we find that manager"s behaviour alters as their optimistic trend during the AGAAP period is converted into pessimistic during the IFRS period. The adoption of IFRS does not contribute to an improvement in IPOs forecast accuracy by reducing absolute forecast error. We attribute this to the complexity and uncertainty that IFRS brings with its adoption. Thus, financial forecasts prepared in accordance with the new set of high quality accounting standards are not of superior quality. We also document that under IFRS investors are unable to infer deviations from the forecasted profits to adjust stock prices for the forecast bias on the first day of IPO trading. Our results further highlight that the change in accounting regulations is unlikely to affect the quality of financial reporting outcomes and yield positive capital market effects in the IPO setting as other (institutional) factors also have to be taken into consideration.
We investigate the high inaccuracy reported by on profit forecasts for the AGAAP sample and it appears that reconciliation with the needs of the market and penalties threat by Australian Authorities have contributed significantly in lowering forecast error over the years. It emerges that determination on actions and luxury of time can bring the ideal results. Those are among the themes that the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) will have to follow in order to reduce further the forecast error under IFRS. We also find that AFE for the last period of AGAAP period is almost equal with the one reported for the starting era of IFRS.
To isolate the effect of IFRS adoption we control for time-varying and persistent unobservable firm characteristics that affect forecast accuracy. We also control for industry-year effects to mitigate any industry and year changes in forecast accuracy. The results are robust to alternative dependent variables, samples of control firms, and forecast horizon choices. We further attempt to improve the fit of our basic model making use of logarithmic transformations of AFE and the results are really encouraging. Previous cross-sectional results indicate mixed and inconsistent results on the role of the auditor. The interaction term IFRS*AUDIT is added in order to capture a potential association.
We contribute to the literature that deals with the financial reporting consequences in several ways. First we document management earnings forecast under two different regulatory regimes (AGAAP and IFRS). Uniquely, we make a direct comparison of management earnings forecast accuracy on a sample of IPOs that were listed under the disclosure requirements of the traditional
Australian GAAP with a sample of IPOs that obligatory followed disclosure requirements of IFRS.
Our findings shed light on a number of issues that have not been addressed previously. They discuss the progress in the accuracy of earnings forecast after the adoption of IFRS, the trend of the forecast (i.e. optimistic -pessimistic) after the regulatory change and any potential connection with self selection theory, the comparative characteristics which appear after the creation of the two samples and the amendments IPOs have to make in order to provide this crucial information for investors.
Second, we complement studies that investigate the ability of IFRS to reduce informational asymmetries in capital markets and contribute effectively to an improvement in the financial information environment. Our study therefore adds to Leuz (2003) who investigates information asymmetry as measured by the level of bid-ask spreads and share turnover for firms either applying U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Third, unlike previous studies that focused on analyst forecast accuracy under IFRS regulations (e.g. Asbaugh and Pincus, (2001); Byard et al. (2011 ) Horton et al. (2012 ), we focus on the accuracy of forecasts made by management. Further, by examining managers" ability to adjust stock prices for the bias in the forecast on the first day of trading, we also contribute to the literature on capital market effects following the introduction of IFRS (e.g. Daske et al., (2008) ).
Finally, this study examines the determinants and consequences of forecast disclosures published at the time of IPOs. Our aim is to understand those determinants and examine their influence in forecasting financial statements and on forecast error. We also explore whether the forecast error, i.e. the difference between actual reported earnings and the expected earnings, is affected by the details and different amount of forecast information in the financial statements during the AGAAP and IFRS periods. Overall the incremental contribution of this study in the IPO and management earnings forecasts literature is the examination of the informational content as an outcome of the financial reporting standards change and the quality signal by newly listed firms to multiple user groups including market makers and investors.
Our study is related to the work of Firth and Smith, (1992) , Jaggi (1997) , Jelic et al. (1998) , Hartnett and Romcke (2000) , Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) , Cormier and Martinez (2006) , CazavanJeny and Jeanjean (2007), Keasey and McGuiness (2008) , Gounopoulos and Skinner (2010) who empirically examine the relationship between management earnings forecast and IPO outcomes. We update their work using a comprehensive sample of AGAAP and IFRS listed firms, as well as by considering earnings forecast and price earnings ratio on the associated relationships. In contrast to all previous evidence all regression models in our study are characterised by high explanatory power of the variation in AFE.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.
Section 3 develops our testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes our sample selection and study design.
Section 5 provides the results of univariate and multivariate analyses. Finally, section 6 concludes our findings and offers suggestions for further research.
Literature review

Literature on the application of IFRS
Proponents of IFRS claim that IFRS are superior accounting standards for several reasons.
First, IFRS can reduce the choice of accounting methods, thus constraining managerial discretion (IASC (1989) , Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) , Barth et. al. (2008) ). Second, IFRS require accounting measurements and recognition that reflect better a firm"s underlying economic position, hence providing more relevant information for investment decisions (IASC [1989] , Barth et. al. [2008] ).
Third, IFRS increases required disclosures, thereby mitigating information asymmetries between firms and their shareholders (Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) ).
Besides the higher financial reporting quality argument, it is also claimed that IFRS increases comparability of firms across markets and countries. Evidences have shown that accounting comparability reduces home bias (Bradshaw et al. (2004) ; Covrig et al. (2007) ), and improves the efficiency of information intermediaries (Bae et al. (2008) ; Bradshaw et al. (2010) ). Covrig et al. (2007) show that voluntary IFRS adoptions facilitate cross-border equity investments. Yu (2010) shows that mandatory IFRS adoption also increases cross-border equity holdings. Horton et al. (2012) find that forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms.
Empirical studies on the economic effects of the IFRS adoption can broadly be classified into three categories: those that investigate financial reporting quality, the ones that explore capital market effects following the introduction of IFRS and studies which challenge the assumptions that a mandated change in accounting standards enhances financial reporting practices. Instead, these studies highlight a number of factors influencing the quality of corporate accounting.
In the financial reporting quality arena, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) Other studies, however, failed to confirm these findings. Ahmed et al. (2010) , for instance, find that the introduction of IFRS results in lower financial reporting quality. They attribute this to a lack of implementation guidance when applying principles-based standards. In addition, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) document that IFRS have not decreased the level of earnings management in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK). In fact, the pervasiveness of earnings management even increased in
France. Thus they are sceptical on whether simply changing accounting standards per se will change the quality of financial reporting amounts.
On the capital market field effects, studies primarily focus on the association between the disclosure of accounting information and predicted capital market effects such as on cost of capital (e.g. Barry and Brown, (1985) ; Lambert et al., (2007) ) and market liquidity (e.g. Diamond and Verrechia, (1991) ; Verrechia, (2001)). The application of IFRS requires increased disclosure and offers higher transparency by reducing accounting discretion. This is expected to better reflect the economic situation of the firm relative to the application of domestic standards. In turn, this reduces information asymmetries among the different capital market participants and limits problems of adverse selection (Welker (1995) ; Healy et al. (1999) ; Lambert et al. (2007) ). As a result, it should ultimately lead to an improvement in the financial information environment.
Numerous studies underline that focusing exclusively on exogenously-imposed accounting standards to determine the quality and usefulness of financial reporting is insufficient. Other studies which challenge the assumptions that a mandated change in accounting standards enhances financial reporting practices identify other important factors that influence the quality of accounting amounts.
Along these lines, Ball (2006) notes that "international differences in financial reporting occur as an endogenous function of local political and economic institutions". Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003) show that political and economic forces strongly affect the incentives of account preparers.
Likewise, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) point out that capital market forces also determine reporting incentives.
In addition, Leuz et al. (2003) , Holthausen (2009) and Christensen (2011) stress the importance of the country"s enforcement regime in the application of accounting standards. In sum, the existing evidence indicates that the implementation of a single set of high quality accounting standards is only one of many factors to shape the financial information environment. This argument is largely based on the assumption that the application of any set of accounting standards requires the use of managerial discretion as well as the use of private information. However, it is the institutional framework that determines to what extent and how managers use this discretion in the preparation of financial reporting information.
Literature on IPO earnings forecasts
A high level of information asymmetry and problems of adverse selection are distinct features of the IPO process making it a classic "lemon problem" as described by Akerlof (1970) . To address this issue, some jurisdictions (e.g. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, among others) allow IPO firms to voluntarily disclose an earnings forecast figure in their prospectuses in order to signal future profitability 4
. Further, potential investors may use this information for IPO valuation (e.g. Kim and Ritter (1999) ). However, the credibility and usefulness of earnings forecasts is heavily dependent on their accuracy.
The literature on IPO forecast accuracy has previously devoted particular attention to Australia as a result of exceptionally high documented forecast errors. For example, reveal mean forecast errors (FE) as high as 994.3% as well as mean absolute forecast errors (AFE) of 1,138.3%. These results indicate that managers systematically overestimate their firms" future profitability. Thus, these inaccurate forecasts rather act as an impediment for potential investors in IPO valuation. In contrast to Australian IPOs, , Jaggi (1997) and Cheng and Firth (2000) , for example report relatively low mean AFE of 18%, 12.86% and 9.89%, respectively for firms seeking a listing in Hong Kong.
Additionally, a well-documented phenomenon in the post-listing period is that IPOs tend to be underpriced i.e. they have a positive first-day return (e.g. Ibbotson, (1975); Ritter, (1984); Loughran and Ritter, (1994) , Thomadakis et al. (2011) ). It is important to notice that if investors are able to anticipate the direction of the bias in IPO profit forecasts, they adjust stock prices accordingly on the first day of trading. Thus, underpricing is expected to be a positive function of FE as Firth ( (1997), (1998)), Keasey and McGuiness (1991) and Chen et al. (2001) support with their empirical evidence.
Hypotheses Development
The main purpose of this study is to examine the economic effects of IFRS around the time of IPOs. In particular, we examine whether the mandatory application of IFRS reduces information asymmetries by improving IPO forecast accuracy in Australia. As IFRS are generally expected to be of superior quality relative to domestic standards, we predict a positive relationship between the change in accounting regulations and IPO earnings forecast accuracy. At the same time, we predict enhanced credibility of forecast financial information as a means of signalling the firms" future prospects. Thus, our first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The mandatory application of IFRS reduces information asymmetries around the time of IPOs by improving the accuracy in IPO earnings
forecasts.
Our second hypothesis investigates the effects of forecast errors on IPO initial returns following the introduction of IFRS. We predict that prior to the application of IFRS investors have been unable to anticipate deviations from the forecasted profits. This is largely due to the unrestricted judgement managers could exercise in financial reporting practices to deliberately distort accounting figures. Therefore, we hypothesize that forecast errors under local GAAP are not related to first dayreturns as investors fail to infer actions taken by managers in the preparation of financial accounts.
However, the application of IFRS demands restricted measurement methods that constrain managers" opportunistic behaviour and aims at improving accounting transparency. Consequently, this will reduce investors" uncertainty about reporting practices as financial information becomes more predictable. Accordingly, investors are able to adjust stock prices on the first day of trading. Thus, our second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is twofold: Although high-quality accounting standards are a material constituent of high-quality financial reporting, other factors may at least be equally important. If these findings hold in the setting presented here, we will not be able to identify the predicted effects.
Sample selection and study design
Sample selection criteria
To capture the influence of IFRS on IPO earnings forecast accuracy and first day-returns, our study focuses on all Australian IPOs during the period January 1, 2001 -December 31, 2009. In a first step, we retrieved a list of these companies from Bloomberg Professional. The initial sample contained 1,098 companies going public in this time period. Consistent with previous Australian studies (e.g. Brown et al., (2000) , Hartnett (2010) ) mining companies were excluded as these firms rarely provide an earnings forecast. This led us to drop 494 companies and resulted in an overall sample of 604 firms 5
. IPO prospectuses for these firms were hand-collected using Bloomberg Professional and
Thomson One Banker. All prospectuses were screened for the inclusion of forward-looking financial information. Therefore, to be included in our preliminary sample, companies had to disclose future earnings information. This resulted in a sample of 282 IPOs.
Further, actual financial information was derived from Bloomberg Professional, Thomson One
Banker and the companies" annual reports. We focused primarily on accounting profit numbers ("the bottom line"). 
Error metrics
We employ two commonly used error measures in this study, namely the forecast error (FE) and the absolute forecast error (AFE). The forecast error is calculated as the difference between the actual profit and the forecasted profit divided by the absolute value of the forecasted profit:
where:
AP i = actual profit of company i, FP i = forecasted profit of company i
The forecast error measures the bias in the forecast (e.g. Keasey and McGuinness, (1991) ; Cheng and Firth, (2000) ; Gounopoulos, (2011)). A positive forecast error (FE > 0) indicates that managers have underestimated the profits disclosed in the IPO prospectus (pessimistic forecast) while a negative forecast error (FE < 0) signals an optimistic forecast with actual profits below forecasted profits. Previous evidence by as well as Hartnett and Römcke (2000) show that, on average, Australian IPOs have negative profit forecast errors indicating overly optimistic forecasts.
However, Jaggi (1997) , among others, reports that profit forecasts tend to be rather pessimistic in Hong Kong, as actual profits exceed its forecasts.
The absolute forecast error is applied to measure the overall accuracy of the forecast. It is calculated as:
The definition of the terms used in the equation is as defined above. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that prior studies have been inconsistent with the choice of denominator used to determine these error metrics. For example Keasey and McGuinness (1991) , Chen et al. (2001) , Lonkani and Firth (2005) and Gounopoulos (2011) use the absolute value of the forecasted profits as the denominator, whereas Jaggi (1997) and Cheng and Firth (2000) refer to the absolute value of the actual profits. Although the results tend not to differ substantially this alternative denominator will further be considered in supplementary analyses to ensure robustness of the findings.
Determinants of forecast bias and accuracy
In order to test the influence of potential determinants on the accuracy of earnings forecasts provided in IPO prospectuses, past research has identified numerous independent variables. However, no study has ever taken different accounting regulations as a factor into consideration. Based on the year of the earnings forecast announcement, this study classifies firms into two groups: (i) forecasts for financial years prior the application of IFRS (the pre-adoption period) and (ii) forecasts for financial years following the application of IFRS (the post-adoption period 
Determinants of initial returns
To additionally explore the effects of accounting standards changes on investors" ability to anticipate deviations from forecasted profits, cross-sectional regression models that use the "raw" (RIR) as well as the "market-adjusted" initial return (MAIR) as dependent variables are investigated. Generally, if investors are able to identify the direction of the forecast bias, then initial returns are a positive function of FE. While positive initial returns (underpricing) are likely to be associated with pessimistic forecasts (FE > 0), optimistic forecasts (FE < 0) are expected to result in negative initial returns. To investigate this proposition under different accounting regulations, an interaction term (IFRS*FE) is introduced in the cross-sectional regression model. In conjunction with the variables IFRS and FE as described above, we can therefore test for differences in investors" prediction ability depending on the financial reporting rules applied.
Furthermore, the variables AGE and SIZE are used as proxies of firm level ex-ante uncertainty (e.g. , Chambers and Dimson, (2009)). The variable RETAIN is applied to identify the relation between equity ownership by company insiders and first day returns. We employ the variables AUDIT and UNW to capture the certification of the IPO by independent advisers. These may be used as a means to reduce some of the prevailing ex-ante uncertainty and results in lower positive initial returns that is less underpricing and "less money left on the table" (e.g. Carter and Manaster, (1990) ; Michaely and Shaw, (1995) ). Further, we control for year-and industry specific effects.
Overall, the combination of all the variables results in the following cross-sectional regressions: 
Results
Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses
The summary statistics of forecast errors and absolute forecast errors measures are shown in .and similar to Hartnett and Römcke (2000) . Yet, the results are relatively higher to other countries, e.g. Hong Kong where mean AFE were invariably below 20% ; Jaggi, (1997); Cheng and Firth, (2000) ). Furthermore, the absolute forecast error is lower under IFRS than under AGAAP. However, the difference in means is not significant (p-value = 0.48).
Our study attempts to provide deeper insights into the structure of forecast bias and accuracy by disaggregating the error metrics according to various characteristics. Nevertheless these findings indicate that the effect of the IFRS introduction seems to be mixed and inconclusive and could have even decreased forecast accuracy. On the whole, these results from multivariate analyses corroborate previous findings of univariate analyses. Together they show that there appears to be no unambiguous and statistically significant association between the mandatory introduction of IFRS and higher IPO earnings forecast accuracy. To conclude, the application of IFRS in Australia does not improve the credibility of forecast financial information as a signalling device in the IPO setting. Thus, we are unable to find empirical evidence to support our first hypothesis (H1) that is stated in alternative form.
Regression Analyses
Among the control variables included in the models 1 and 2 of the total sample as displayed in table 6, only the coefficient estimates for HORIZON and SIZE show the predicted sign and are also statistically significant. Although several previous studies (e.g. ; Jaggi, (1997); Chen et al. (2001); Gounopoulos, (2011) ) identified a positive association between HORIZON and AFE, their findings did not prove to be statistically significant. As a result, this study is among the first to attribute a statistically significant positive impact to the length of the forecast horizon on AFE.
Similarly, previous findings between SIZE and AFE have revealed controversial results. While and Chen and Firth (1999) ) identified a negative relation between the size of the company and AFE which is in line with our predictions, others found contrary results. Lonkani and Firth (2005) , for example, reveal a positive and significant relation between SIZE and AFE which indicates that larger firms provide less accurate forecasts. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the proxies for firm size are not consistent across studies. This likely hampers universal interpretations and comparisons.
<insert table 7 here>
Similar to the overall sample findings, the results for the partitioned sample on SIZE are significant with the predicted negative sign. Therefore, during both, the pre-and post-IFRS period, forecasts provided by larger companies proved to exhibit higher accuracy. Substantial differences are also reported on the effect of employing a high quality auditor (AUDITOR). Focusing on the AGAAP period earnings forecasts indicates that management of companies audited by a Big 4 auditor tend to achieve a significantly higher level of accuracy. In contrast, both specifications show a positive relation between the use of a reputable auditor and AFE for forecasts prepared under IFRS, although none is significant. This finding is rather surprising as one might have expected that these auditors adapt more quickly and effectively to the new set of internationally recognised accounting regulations due to their global network and internal knowledge base.
Results of initial returns
We continue by examining the association between initial returns and the regulatory change to IFRS as stated in the second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b). If investors are able to infer the direction of the bias in IPO earnings forecasts we expect initial returns to be a positive function of FE. As a result, we fail to reject the null form of H2a.
On the control variables side small firms offer good market adjusted initial returns to their investors appearing to be a good short investment opportunity. Furthermore, adoption of high quality and globally applicable IFRS do not improve the level of underpricing in the immediate aftermarket as was initially expected. This confirms findings by Leuz (2003) . Finally, underpricing effects on the partitioned samples also indicate differences in the explanatory variables SIZE and RETAIN.
Discussion
A. Why is there a change in the mentality of forecast?
A natural question that arises from our findings is why optimistic earnings forecasts during the GAAP era turn pessimistic in the IFRS period. In particular, the negative mean error of -13.34% for IPOs providing earnings forecast during the AGAAP period turns positive at 2.95% for IPOs announcing an 10 In contrast, Chen et al. (2001) as well as Lonkani and Firth (2005) report that investors of Hong Kong and Thai IPOs are able to infer the direction of the forecast bias. 11 The appropriate coefficient estimates of FE under the new set of accounting standards are (-9.5947+12.4921) = 2.8974 for RIR and (-9.5671+12.2820) = 2.7149 for MAIR.
earnings forecast in the IFRS period. We offer two potential explanations for management"s mentality change after the introduction of IFRS.
First, there are reasons to be skeptical on the earnings forecast announcement during the use of IFRS as there is sufficient pressure in international level to make corporate reporting more informative and more comparable (Horton et al (2012) ). Managers, scared from escalating pressure and continuously increasing trend of available public information, transform their mentality to more conservative on their effort to achieve accuracy. This is in addition a strategic move as it allows window for good news in the aftermarket and aim for investors" satisfaction. 
B. Why does absolute forecast error not improve after the adoption of IFRS?
Another relevant question raised by our results concerns the luck of improvement in the level of error after the introduction of IFRS. Specifically the average AFE was decreased from 36.52% during AGAAP to 32.00% under IFRS. In addition, multivariate analyses fail to assign a positive effect on forecast accuracy to the introduction of IFRS. We attempt to shed light on these phenomena.
On a first slight we see that managements" main concern has been to reduce their optimistic approach on producing earnings forecast and target the perfect accuracy. Towards this direction they failed to see the optimum point and passed "across the river" by switching to conservative forecast approach. Their estimation has been so wrong that resulted in loss of control and finally retention of the gap between forecast and actual earnings. This phenomenon can be explained by "managerial myopia" theory, Stein (1988) , as there is an underestimation of the potential earnings forecasts in the long term.
Second, listing under the IFRS leads to greater reputational exposure due to their international recognition. Regarding the quality, Daske and Gebhardt (2006) show that disclosure excellence has increased significantly under IFRS in "code law" countries and thus creates relatively greater incentives for management to render superior services in earnings forecast. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) studying "common law" countries and specifically Australia suggest that the switch to IFRS was not a major vector of improvement in terms of earnings quality. This is strongly confirmed by our results, as evidently accuracy remains at the same levels after the introduction of IFRS.
Third, the standards" introduction is associated with various operational hurdles, which are due to difficulties in implementing and understanding the IFRS due to their complexity. You and Zhang (2009) and Schrodl and Klein (2012) assume that the more the regulations deviate from the former GAAP, the greater the degree of complexity that countries will experience. This complexity on the understanding and implementations of IFRS has created great difficulties on accountants which have not been extremely helpful to the management and ended up with an increase of the margin between forecast and actual earnings. We expect that as this complexity will be replaced with confidence over the years so the error will get reduced and more accurate forecasts will follow.
Additional robustness checks
To further explore the effect of IFRS on IPO earnings forecasts and to investigate the sensitivity of our findings, several supplementary analyses and robustness checks have been conducted. In particular, we test the effect of modifications of the dependent variable (AFE) used in the regression analyses, examine the findings when large AFE (outliers) are included and investigate the role of the auditor to sign forecast financial information. All findings are presented in table 9.
A. Modifications of the dependent variable
As the distributions of AFE are positively skewed, our first modification (1) In addition, we also test the accuracy of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts in IPO prospectuses (modification 2). The result shows low overall significance while the coefficient estimate of IFRS is negative but insignificant. This confirms our previous findings that the introduction of IFRS does not improve profit forecast accuracy.
Finally, our last modification of the dependent variable follows the approach referred to by Jaggi (1997) as well as Cheng and Firth (2000) . These studies use the absolute value of the actual profit as a deflator in the calculation of FE and AFE. However, cross-sectional regression results of the IFRS coefficient (not reported here) are inconclusive and highly insignificant. Thus, this further corroborates previous findings.
B. Consideration of outliers
To control for the effects of the few outliers that may distort our results and interpretations, our samples had previously been winsorised at the 5% level so that eleven profit forecasts were dropped from the sample. Modification 3 presents findings of cross-sectional regressions on the sample including large outliers. This increases the sample size to 232 observations for IPO profit forecasts. As expected, we report a general deterioration in the fit of the model and also low overall significance of the regression. The coefficient of IFRS is negative but insignificant (-0.8279; t-stat. = -1.49 ). Similar findings are reported when EPS forecast accuracy is applied as a dependent variable (not reported here). Further, a close look on the control variables also reveals that long time horizon of forecasts is associated with inaccurate forecast estimation. In addition, small firms are able to provide a more accurate earnings forecast.
C. The role of the auditor
Previous cross-sectional results have also revealed mixed and inconsistent results on the role of the auditor, particularly following the IFRS introduction. Theoretical models (Titman and Trueman, (1986); Datar et al. (1991) ) consider the choice of the auditor as an additional device to signal the superior quality of shares to the market. Consequently, we examine differential effects of forecast accuracy between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms when applying IFRS (modification 4). The interaction term IFRS*AUDIT is therefore added to equation (5) The coefficient estimate of IFRS is negative and significant at the 10% level for earnings forecasts. Moreover, the coefficient estimate of IFRS*AUDIT is positive and significant at the 5%-level indicating that the effect of IFRS on forecast accuracy is lower when financial information is audited by a member of the Big 4. These results also contradict general theory (DeAngelo (1981)) as well as earlier Australian evidence (Lee et al. (2006) ) on the role of high-quality auditors. We show that the effect of IFRS on accounting quality as measured by AFE is higher if the auditor is not a member of the Big 4 audit firms. To conclude, the choice of a reputable auditor does not serve as a credible means to signal superior quality in the IFRS-environment.
Conclusion
Motivated by the current debate about the merits and consequences of a regulatory accounting change to IFRS, this study contributes by providing a first-time evidence on its financial reporting consequences in the context of Australian IPO earnings forecasts. We find that in line with selfselection theory the study reveals that manager"s behaviour changes as their tendency towards optimism by overestimating earnings during the AGAAP period ( Findings of supplementary analyses question the use of a reputable auditor to credibly signal the high quality of shares. We show that the effect of IFRS on accounting quality as measured by AFE is higher if the auditor is not a member of the Big 4 audit firms. Thus, reputable auditors have inferior expertise in applying IFRS in the context of IPO profit forecasts. Overall, we conclude that simply applying IFRS neither reduces the level of information asymmetry nor diminishes problems of adverse selection in the IPO context. Accordingly, the IPO process in Australia is still subject to a relatively high amount of ex-ante uncertainty.
Our study confirms previous evidence that the quality of financial reporting outcomes is not solely determined by the application of exogenously-imposed accounting standards (e.g. Ball et al. (2000) ; Ball, (2006) ; Burgstahler et al. (2006) ). In fact, they strongly underline the dominant role of endogenous factors that shape the accounting environment such as the country"s institutional framework and managers" reporting incentives. Further, relative to other jurisdictions, in particular the U.S., companies in Australia operate in a rather low-litigation environment. Neither managers nor auditors have to fear severe legal suits if financial forecasts turn out to be wrong or misleading.
Apart from subsequent negative stock price reactions to adjust for the forecast error, managers lack additional (ex-ante) incentives to provide accurate and trustworthy profit forecasts. Accordingly, this study confirms that the quality of forecast financial information is independent of the set of accounting standards. It is rather an endogenous function determined by the interaction between the legal environment, capital market forces and financial reporting incentives. Therefore, in order to improve the credibility of financial forecasts as part of the listing process these factors have to be devoted particular attention.
In response to the concerns raised in the introduction, the findings of this paper have three major implications: i) the alteration to the IFRS regulatory regime brought uncertainty that did not help on improving the accuracy of earnings forecast and consequently did not improve the financial information environment; ii) issuers were scared with the increased pressure associated with the introduction of IFRS and turned their forecast trend from optimistic to pessimistic and iii) adopting IFRS and allowing adequate time for market adaptation is expecting to help on achieving forecast accuracy. Overall, this paper resolves the long-standing puzzle of accuracy in management earnings forecasts -an important financial reporting issue. This table presents summary descriptive statistics of the control variables included to explain forecast accuracy. The control variables are, AGE -the number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its inception before the year of listing, RETAIN -proportion of retained ownership by the pre-IPO shareholders, SIZE -the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, HORIZON -the number of months between the issue of the prospectus and the end of the forecasting period, AUDIT -auditor reputation: "1" for reputable auditors defined as one of (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and You ng and KPMG or "0" for non-reputable auditors, UND -underwriter presence: "1" if the offer has been underwritten and "0" if there was no underwriter. Panel D displays results of two sample t-tests to test equality of means of the partitioned samples. Panel E displays results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-tests to test equality of medians of the partitioned samples. Table 6 : Descriptive statistics on "raw" and "market adjusted" initial returns This table presents results from OLS regressions with the 'raw' (RIR) and 'market-adjusted' (MAIR) initial return as the dependent variables. The sample sizes consist of 214 initial return measures for profit forecasts and 186 for EPS forecasts, respectively. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The model specifications differ in their application of industry and year effects. The other control variables are as described previously. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance-level (two-tailed), respectively. This table presents OLS regression results from various robustness checks. Modification 1 uses the logarithm of AFE as the dependent variable, modification 2 uses the AFE of forecasted EPS as the dependent variable, modification 3 includes large outliers of AFE and modification 4 examines the role of the auditor. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The control variables are as described previously. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance-level (two-tailed), respectively.
